People have many ways of protecting themselves against unfavorable social comparisons. Sometimes, however, the unfavorableness of a comparison is too unambiguous to deny. In such circumstances, people may indirectly protect their self-images by exaggerating the ability of those who outperform them. Aggrandizing the outperformer is conceived to be a construal mechanism that permits inferior performers to deflect the self-esteem threat of being outperformed while maintaining believability. The tendency to exaggerate an outperformer's ability was demonstrated in a context in which subjects learned they had been outperformed by a confederate on a perceptual intelligence test. Subjects' and observers' ratings of the confederate's intelligence showed that subjects consistently rated the confederate more favorably than did observers. Using a similar methodology in which subjects outperformed confederates, another study showed that subjects exaggerated the ability of the people they outperformed. The conditions in which these effects are most likely to be obtained are discussed.
The present research focused on the consequences of receiving unfavorable social comparison feedback. Whereas most social comparison research has been interested in self-evaluation, in this research we examined people's perceptions of those who outperform them. Because being outperformed is potentially threatening to self-esteem, people may try to restore esteem by altering their perceptions of outperformers. Previously discussed mechanisms for maintaining esteem following unfavorable comparisons include downgrading the validity of the comparison and denigrating or distancing oneself from the outperformer (e.g., Hakmiller, 1966; Pyszcynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985; Wills, 1981 ) . In the present studies, we sought to demonstrate a diametrically opposite esteem-saving mechanism, namely exalting the comparison target. In particular, we explored conditions in which comparers exaggerate the ability of their outperformers, or what we call the "genius effect."
We assume exalting the outperformer is a strategy that is applied when a person is unambiguously outperformed and cannot easily distort the validity of the comparison. Mundane examples include a student who is consistently outperformed by a classmate, an academic whose publications are far exceeded by a colleague's, and a golfer who is trounced by a partner. By elevating the abilities of the person whose performance dwarfs their own, people can maintain their sense of competence while magnanimously acknowledging the superior attributes of the outperformer.
Although in the past researchers have assessed upward comparisons with superior performers, few have examined the consequences of actually being outperformed, and even fewer have examined perceptions of the outperformer. The consequences of being directly outperformed have been addressed most systemat-ically in Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance model (Tesser, 1988 (Tesser, , 1991 . According to Tesser, unfavorable comparisons engender a reflection or comparison process. The reflection process occurs when the comparison target is close to the comparer and when the comparison is relatively unimportant for selfesteem. Under these conditions, comparers bask in upward comparisons and indirectly enhance their self-esteem. The comparison process occurs when comparers are outperformed on an important dimension by close others. When the comparison process is engaged, comparers can deemphasize their closeness to the target, downgrade the relevance of the comparison dimension, or hinder the target's performance.
The self-evaluation maintenance model assumes outperformers will be denigrated or avoided except when there is a close relationship with the superior performer and when the performance dimension is relatively trivial. These predictions accord with other perspectives on social comparison that assume upward social comparisons tend to evoke defensive attributional strategies, such as questioning the validity of the task or downgrading the importance of the comparison (e.g., Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Morse & Gergen, 1970) . However, for defensive attributional strategies to be effective, they must be believable (Schlenker, 1985) . In other words, people must have faith in their biased explanations. When people are directly and unambiguously outperformed, it may be difficult for them to deny, explain away, or ignore the comparison target's superiority.
In these conditions, exaggerating the outperformer's ability is a strategy that enables inferior performers to deflect the threat of unfavorable upward comparisons while satisfying the demands of believability. In a review of the upward social comparison literature, Collins (1996) argued that upward comparisons are preferable to downward comparisons when they can be construed to negate the implications of inferior performance. We propose that exaggerating the outperformer's ability is a construal mechanism that negates the potentially negative implications of unfavorable social comparisons by allowing inferior performers to discount the relevance of the comparison. Comparing unfavorably to a person with exceptionally high abilities, therefore, obviates the downward adjustments in one's perceived competence that would be likely to occur after being unambiguously outperformed by a lesser target (Mettee & Smith, 1977) .
Exalting the outperformer also helps inferior performers resolve a perennial social comparison dilemma, namely, the dilemma of desiring informational clarity while fearing unpleasant hedonic consequences (Brickman & Bulman, 1977) . Because elevating the outperformer's ability provides a buffer against diminutions in one's sense of competence, inferior performers acquire informational clarity by learning about the upper range of the ability distribution without suffering unpleasant hedonic consequences as a result. An anecdotal example would be a club tennis champion having the opportunity to play a match against Pete Sampras: Although the player would be resoundingly trounced, he would probably relish the opportunity to experience directly the highest level of tennis ability. Furthermore, his own status as club champion would be unthreatened by the comparison; thus, the club champion could enthusiastically declaim Sampras's ability without recalibrating his own ability level.
The hypothesis that people exaggerate the ability of superior performers requires comparison of the ability ratings of people who are and who are not outperformed. To effectuate this comparison, participants in the present studies completed a test of perceptual intelligence with a confederate and subsequently learned that the confederate's performance exceeded their own. An observer witnessed the performances of the subject and the confederate and was made aware of each person's score. We directly tested the hypothesis that people exaggerate the ability of superior performers by comparing the ratings of the confederate's perceptual intelligence made by the outperformed subject and by the observer, who was simply aware of the scores. We predicted an interaction such that participants and observers would not differ in their ratings of the participant's perceptual intelligence but that participants would rate the confederate's perceptual intelligence more favorably than would observers.
Study 1
Method
Participants. Participants were 78 (37 male and 41 female) undergraduates who participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. No main effects or interactions were obtained for subject-gender in this or subsequent studies. Thus, the gender variable is not discussed further.
Materials and procedure.
Participants enlisted for what they believed was a study of novel intellectual skills. There were three samegender individuals in each session: one subject, one confederate, and one observer. Gender was held constant to avoid effects stemming from men's and women's different expectations for, or reactions to, each other's performance. For example, subjects might adhere to the stereotype that men are better at spatial or perceptual tasks. Two male and two female confederates were used throughout these sessions. ~ Whichever subject arrived first was designated to be the observer and was brought to an adjoining room equipped with a one-way mirror. The purpose of watching from behind a one-way mirror was ostensibly to avoid making test takers anxious. Subjects, however, were actually unaware of being viewed by the observers. Observers were told their task was to observe carefully two students who were completing a novel test of perceptual intelligence and to rate their ability on the basis of their performance. Observers were then given the opportunity to see the items on the test and were asked to do two practice items. By giving observers experience with the test items before subjects began the test and allowing them to watch subjects answer each question, we sought to minimize problems arising from differences in familiarity with the test items.
A second experimenter led the subject and confederate into an adjacent room and seated them beside each other at a table. Subjects and confederates were told they would be completing a test measuring an important intellectual ability, perceptual intelligence. The test actually comprised 12 items from Raven's (1965) progressive matrices (2 practice items and 10 test items). This test presents a series of incomplete figures and requires the test taker to judge which of eight segments would accurately complete each figure. We selected 2 relatively easy items for the practice phase and 10 relatively difficult items for the test phase. Before beginning, participants read along while the experimenter read the following cover story.
The psychology department has developed a test of perceptual intelligence that has been shown to be a highly reliable and valid instrument for assessing people's ability to process perceptual information. In this experiment, we are interested in seeing how well you can perform on this test.
A different set of confederates was used for each study.
You will be given an answer sheet on which to mark all your answers, and one test booklet. All your answers will be made on your answer sheet. You will also notice that a subject number has been assigned to each of you. None of your scores will be paired with your name, only with your subject number.
The remaining instructions described the test and the participants' task in detail. Participants were given 10 min to complete all the problems. The confederate had been provided with the answers in advance. Pretesting established that the average student in the undergraduate population could answer approximately 3 of the l0 test items correctly. By prearrangement, the confederate always answered seven items correctly. The confederate was instructed to finish within 1 rain after the subject.
Observers watched the subjects and confederates from behind a oneway mirror. The mirror was above subjects' heads so that they could not see themselves (thereby eliminating potential problems of objective self-awareness). The seats of subjects and confederates were angled so that observers could see their answers. At the end of the l0 min, the experimenter explained that he or she was not allowed to see how they performed and that, therefore, participants would score each other's tests. Subjects and confederates then exchanged tests. The experimenter read the answers and told subjects and confederates to cross out incorrect responses and write the correct answers underneath. A line was provided on the bottom of the answer sheet for indicating the number of correct items. After writing the number of problems answered correctly on the answer sheet, subjects and confederates returned each other's sheets and were given a chance to see their scores. The experimenter then brought both sheets to the observer to ensure the observer knew each person's score. Subjects and observers then made their ratings of the confederate and the subject.
Dependent variables. The dependent variables were subjects' and observers' ratings of the subjects' and confederates' perceptual intelligence. Ratings were made on a 10-point scale ranging from 0 (extremely low) to 9 (extremely high). To maintain the believability of our initial cover story, we asked subjects to also answer a variety of filler questions concerning their perceptions of the test. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for ratings of subjects' and confederates' perceptual intelligence. The main statistical analysis included the within-subject variable of ratings of the subject versus the confederate and the between-subjects variable of the rater (subject or observer). Effect size calculations (Cohen's d) are included for each hypothesis test.
Results and Discussion
The within-subject variable yielded a significant effect, F( 1, 76) = 92.34, p < .0001, d = 2.20, showing that ratings of the confederate's perceptual intelligence were generally higher than ratings of the subject's perceptual intelligence. More important, the predicted interaction was obtained between the rater (subject or observer) and the target being rated (subject or confederate), F(1, 76) = 4.13, p < .05, d = 0.47. Follow-up tests showed that there was no difference between subjects and observers in their judgments of the subjects' perceptual intelligence (F < 1 ) but that subjects rated the confederate's perceptual intelligence more highly than did observers, F( 1, 76) = 14.65, p < .0003, d = 0.88. This interaction pattern eliminates a potential alternative interpretation of the findings. If subjects had rated their own perceptual intelligence more highly than observers, their higher ratings of the confederate could be an artifact of their elevated selfratings. In other words, both subjects and observers might have had equally inflated perceptions of the confederate's perceptual ability, but the obtained differences could have been due to subjects' beginning at a different baseline because of their elevated self-ratings. The fact that subjects and observers did not differ in their ratings of subjects' perceptual intelligence effectively eliminates this interpretation. 2 These results, therefore, support the hypothesis that people exaggerate the ability of those who outperform them. Even with perceptions of the subject's perceptual intelligence equated, subjects evaluated the confederate's ability more favorably than did observers.
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to enhance the privacy of subjects' responses to see whether self-presentational concerns are a necessary component of the genius effect. The potential importance of self-presentational concerns in upward comparisons was investigated by Gould, Brounstein, and Sigall (1977) . Participants in this study first learned they had attained an average level of performance on a tactile perception task. In some conditions, participants expected to compete for money against a person who had previously competed successfully on this task. Participants then estimated the potential competitor's ability. Attribu-2 We became aware of this potential problem after conducting an initial study that examined only general intelligence. Although subjects rated the confederate's general intelligence more favorably than did observers, they also rated their own general intelligence more favorably. Because subjects evaluated their own general intelligence more favorably than did observers, their elevated ratings of the confederate could have been an artifact of their elevated self-ratings. "Hae same findings regarding general intelligence were obtained in the present study. As with ratings of perceptual intelligence, subjects rated the confederate's general intelligence more favorably than did observers, F( 1, 76) = 6.80, p < .02, d = 0.60. In contrast to the results for perceptual intelligence, however, these results were ambiguated by the aforementioned tendency for subjects to rate their own general intelligence more favorably than observers, F( 1, 76) = 10.54, p < .002, d = 0.74, and by the lack of an interaction between the rater and the target (F < 1 ). With the benefit of hindsight, it makes sense that subjects' assessments of their general intelligence would be undiminished by their poor performance on one aspect of intelligence, namely, perceptual intelligence. In fact, the argument that target aggrandizement buttresses subjects' sense of competence suggests that their evaluations of their general intelligence might actually improve as a result of exaggerating the target's ability. This issue is the primary focus of Study 3. tions were made either publicly (names and social security numbers were required on the questionnaires) or privately (responses were placed in a sealed envelope without names or social security numbers and taken to the department secretary). Results showed that higher ability was ascribed to the potential competitor when attributions were made publicly rather than privately.
Because Gould and his colleagues (1977) were concerned with the self-presentational aspect of ability attributions, their primary comparisons were between conditions of public and private responding. Thus, they included no controls (such as our observer subjects) against which to compare subjects' attributions. For this reason, it is impossible to ascertain whether the tendency to exaggerate a potential outperformer's ability in their study was limited to public response conditions or was simply magnified in such conditions. Furthermore, Gould et al. assessed the consequences of anticipated rather than actual outperformance, whereas we were concerned with people's tendency to exaggerate the ability of others who actually outperform them. The relevance of Gould et al.'s findings for this purpose is limited by the fact that their subjects never interacted with the competitors and therefore did not know if the competitors were more competent at the task.
Nevertheless, Gould et al.'s (1977) findings raise the question of whether the tendency to exaggerate an outperformer's ability occurs in private conditions. Although neither names nor other forms of identification were attached to the questionnaires in Study 1, it is possible that participants were concerned that the experimenter or confederate would see their evaluations. If participants believed their responses would be scrutinized, they might be motivated to appear modest, polite, or magnanimous. Therefore, in addition to replicating the findings of Study 1, the purpose of Study 2 was to see whether the tendency to exaggerate the outperformer's ability would be obtained when responses were more carefully hidden from the experimenter and confederate.
Method
Participants. Students were 38 ( 18 male and 20 female) undergraduates participating in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.
Procedure. The procedure of Study 2 was similar to that of Study 1, with modifications added to increase the privacy of subjects' responses. As before, observers were brought to a room with a one-way mirror. By a bogus random drawing, the subject or confederate was brought either to an adjoining or a nonadjoining room. Bringing the subject to a separate room allowed for more private responding because there was no chance of the experimenter or confederate seeing the subjects' ratings of the confederate. In addition, all questionnaires were placed in a sealed envelope. Placing the subject in a separate room also reduced the chances that observers would perceive the subject and confederate as an interacting unit. If observers saw subjects and confederates as partners, they might assimilate the confederate's ability to the subject's, thereby accounting for their tendency to evaluate the confederate less favorably.
After explaining the same procedural details as before, the experimenter told subjects they would take the test one at a time and that while one subject was completing the test, the other was free to work on homework or read the paper. After the first subject was finished, the subject and confederate switched rooms so that the observer could now see the second person complete the test. The order in which observers saw the subject and confederate was counterbalanced.
The experimenter again explained that test takers would score each other's tests. In Study 2, however, ability attributions were made in separate rooms and then placed in sealed envelopes. Thus, subjects could be more confident that neither experimenters nor confederates could see their responses. After the tests were scored, the experimenter returned to the observer's room and showed both score sheets to the observer.
Results and Discussion
Means and standard deviations of subjects' and observers' ratings of the confederate's perceptual intelligence are provided in Table 2 . A significant main effect again showed that subjects and observers considered the confederate to be higher in perceptual intelligence than the subject, F( 1, 36) = 19.48, p < .0001, d = 1.47. The critical interaction between the rater (subject or observer) and the person being rated (subject or confederate) was also significant, F(1, 36) = 4.18, p < .05, d = 0.68. Follow-up tests showed that the difference between subjects' and observers' ratings of the subject's perceptual intelligence was nonsignificant (F < 1 ). However, the comparison demonstrating subjects' tendency to exaggerate the confederate's ability relative to the observer was significant, F( 1, 36) = 9.92, p < .004, d = 1.05.
Thus, the tendency to exaggerate the intelligence of a superior performer was again demonstrated in a context in which there were no differences between subjects' and observers' ratings of the subject's ability on the task. Furthermore, these findings were obtained in highly private response conditions, showing that the tendency to exaggerate an outperformer's ability cannot be adequately explained by concerns with self-presentation to a public audience.
Study 3
A fundamental assumption underlying the genius effect is that exaggerating the outperformer's ability protects or restores the inferior performer's threatened sense of competence. However, this assumption was tested only indirectly in the first two studies. To evaluate this interpretation more directly, in Study 3 we varied whether people who were outperformed had the opportunity to evaluate the outperformer. If exaggerating the outperformer's ability maintains the comparer's perceived competence, those given the chance to exaggerate the outperformer's ability should subsequently evaluate themselves more favorably than those who do not have this opportunity. In essence, exaggerating the outperformer's ability serves to discount the relevance of the comparison for calibrating one's own ability level and provides a buffer against a loss in perceived competence. We expected, therefore, to obtain differences in subjects' perceptions of their own ability depending on whether they were given the chance to evaluate the outperformer.
As noted in the introduction, self-serving mechanisms must be believable to be effective. As many other social comparison studies have shown, people are more self-serving when the dimensions on which they evaluate their abilities and characteristics are ambiguous, thus allowing them some latitude for interpretation (Alicke, 1985; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985) . For people to restore their sense of competence as a result of aggrandizing the outperformer, therefore, the competence judgment must be somewhat ambiguous. For this reason, we did not expect participants who were unambiguously outperformed on a perceptual intelligence test to alter their evaluations of their perceptual intelligence. It would be unrealistic for participants to reassess their perceptual intelligence when they have just performed poorly on this dimension. In contrast, we did not expect aggrandizing the outperformer to influence self-assessments on extremely broad categories such as self-esteem or general competence. As a compromise between extremely specific and extremely broad response dimensions, therefore, we selected general intelligence as the dimension on which to assess the hypothesis that aggrandizing the outperformer protects people's threatened sense of competence.
Method
Participants. Students in Study 3 were 50 (27 male and 23 female) psychology undergraduates whose participation partially fulfilled a course requirement.
Procedure. The procedure for this study included only two conditions: one in which participants were outperformed and then given the opportunity (as in previous studies) to evaluate the outperformer and one in which participants who were outperformed were not given this opportunity. No observer subjects were used in Study 3. The experiment for subjects who did not evaluate the outperformer was completed after they rated their own general intelligence. Subjects who did have the opportunity to evaluate the outperformer evaluated their own and the outperformer's general intelligence on a 10-point scale ranging from 0 (extremely low) to 9 (extremely high).
Results and Discussion
If exaggerating the outperformer's ability helps maintain one's perceived competence on a task following upward comparisons, then subjects given the opportunity to rate the outperformer should subsequently evaluate their own general intelligence more favorably than subjects who were outperformed but not given this opportunity. This is precisely what happened, F( l, 48) = 4.68, p < .04, d = 0.62. As expected, aggrandizing the target led to increased ratings of general intelligence (M = 6.40, SD = 1.19) in comparison with subjects who were simply outperformed but did not rate the outperformer (M = 5.60, SD = 1.41).
The results of this study, therefore, fill a conceptual gap in our interpretation of the genius effect, which assumes that exaggerating the target's ability restores or enhances people's perceptions of their competence. One limitation of Study 3, however, is that we were unable to distinguish whether aggrandizing the outperformer actually restores a threatened sense of competence back to its baseline (i.e., preoutperformance) level or actually enhances perceived competence beyond baseline. The latter possibility suggests, counterintuitively, that being unambiguously outperformed can in some circumstances actually improve people's perceived competence. A person who lost an exhibition tennis match against Pete Sampras, for example, might be impressed by the one serve he returned or the accidental ace he hit and therefore might acquire new insight into his ability. This possibility seems more compelling, however, in direct competition rather than in the outperformance context of our studies.
Further research is also needed to establish the parameters within which restoration or enhancement of perceived competence takes place. We selected general intelligence as a compromise between perceptual intelligence, which is the dimension on which participants performed poorly, and self-esteem or general competence, which we thought were too broad. In the absence of previous research, however, it is difficult to predict which dimensions people will use to restore their threatened sense of competence. The most relevant literature for addressing this problem involves compensatory self-inflation following failure experiences. Our third study could plausibly be viewed as an instance of compensation in which people who have been outperformed on the dimension of perceptual intelligence and who have the opportunity to aggrandize the outperformer compensate by elevating their general intelligence ratings (relative to those who have no opportunity to aggrandize). There are a number of reasons, however, for doubting whether our results actually represent compensation effects. First, previous research has obtained compensation primarily on dimensions orthogonal to those on which the unfavorable feedback was provided. Brown and Smart (1991) , for example, found that high-self-esteem subjects (but not low-self-esteem subjects) compensated for failure at an intellectual task by exaggerating the positivity of their social attributes. The same orthogonality exists in earlier compensation studies by Baumeister and Jones (1978) and Greenberg and Pyszczynski ( 1985 ) . By contrast, the perceptual intelligence dimension on which our participants were outperformed is a component of general intelligence rather than an orthogonal dimension.
Another reason for doubting whether the results of Study 3 represent compensation as it has previously been defined is that compensation would seem more likely to occur in the group that has no opportunity to aggrandize. That is, one could argue that the only recourse for nonaggrandizing subjects is to compensate on other dimensions. As the results of Study 3 show, however, general intelligence ratings are higher in the group that does aggrandize the outperformer, a finding that is consistent with our interpretation that explicitly exaggerating the outperformer's'ability restores a threatened sense of competence. Finally, compensation effects are not particularly robust; Baumeister and Jones ( 1978 ) obtained such effects only in highly public response conditions, and Brown and Smart (1991) found evidence of compensation only for high-self-esteem individuals.
formed to be higher in perceptual intelligence than did observers, .F(1, 78) = 17.70, p < .0001, d = 0.95.
Study 4
We have argued that exaggerating an outperformer's ability indirectly helps the comparer maintain a relatively favorable self-evaluation. The greater the ability of the vanquisher, the less negative are the implications for the vanquishee. Consider now the converse case, in which the subject is the outperformer. If relative ability comparisons are motivated by the need to maintain one's sense of competence, it stands to reason that people will also exaggerate the ability of the person they outperform. In general, the self-enhancing value of outperforming another person should increase commensurately with that person's ability. Just as there is no ignominy in a club champion losing a tennis match to Pete Sampras, there is no glory in defeating a novice. Thus, comparers should accord the highest ability level possible to the people they outperform. The possibility that people exaggerate the ability of those they outperform was examined in Study 4 with a methodology similar to those in the first two studies except that subjects outperformed rather than underperformed the confederate.
Method
Eighty (40 male and 40 female) undergraduate psychology students participated for partial course credit. The methodology of this study was similar to the first two studies except that we used test items that were easy to ensure that participants would outperform the confederate. By prearrangement, the confederate always received a score of three.
Results and Discussion
As expected, all subjects outperformed the confederate. Means and standard deviations for subjects' and observers' ratings of the subjects' and confederates' perceptual intelligence are provided in Table 3 .
The interaction between the rater (subject or observer) and the person being rated (subject or confederate) was again significant, F(1, 78) = 20.21, p < .0001, d = 1.02. Follow-up comparisons showed that observers actually rated subjects more favorably in perceptual intelligence than subjects rated themselves, F( 1, 78) = 4.19, p < .05, d = 0.46. The critical finding showed that subjects rated the confederate who they outper- Sooner or later, we all meet our match. Even people with exceptional abilities or attributes will eventually encounter someone who is smarter, more attractive, happier, or wealthier than themselves. If the conditions in which upward comparisons occur are sufficiently ambiguous, the comparer has recourse to a variety of identity-repairing excuses. Consider the case of a college student who is outperformed by a roommate on a test. If she were unsure of how much each person studied, the student could perhaps convince herself her roommate had studied harder. Alternatively, she might claim the test was unfair, that she studied the wrong material, or that she had a bad day.
Unfortunately, good excuses can be hard to find. The aforementioned student might be well aware that she studied harder than her roommate, that the test was fair, and that she studied the right material. If she proferred excuses along these lines, she would have trouble maintaining believability to herself or others. We have argued that when people are unambiguously outperformed, they can salvage a favorable self-image by deploying a potent construal mechanism, namely, exaggerating the outperformer's ability. In the studies reported in this article, subjects who were outperformed by a confederate on a perceptual intelligence test rated the confederate's perceptual ability higher than did uninvolved observers. Specifically, significant interactions were obtained between rater and ratee showing that observers and subjects did not differ in their ratings of the subjects' perceptual intelligence but that subjects consistently rated the confederate more favorably than did observers. This interaction pattern eliminates the possibility that subjects' elevated ratings of the confederate were an artifact of their elevated selfratings.
We increased the privacy of responding in Study 2 to show that the genius effect is not limited to conditions in which inferior performers want to appear modest or magnanimous. However, further research is needed to clarify the role of self-presentational concerns in upward social comparisons. Although Study 2 showed that self-presentational concerns are not a necessary component of the genius effect, they may nevertheless augment the effect's magnitude in some circumstances. The potential moderating effect of self-presentational concerns was not investigated in our studies because we did not attempt to create highly public response conditions. In the previously discussed research of Gould et al. (1977) , publicity enhanced participants' tendencies to exaggerate the ability of a potential competitor. Research by Brown and Gallagher (1992) also suggests the tendency to exaggerate an outperformer's ability might be accentuated in public conditions. Participants in their studies received failure feedback on a novel intelligence test and then rated themselves and others on a series of trait adjectives. Half the participants made their responses with the experimenter watching whereas the other half made them privately. The most pertinent finding for present purposes was that participants who experienced public failure were relatively modest about their performance, that is, they rated themselves less favorably and others more favorably when they failed than when they suc-ceeded. In common with the Gould et al. research, however, participants in these studies were not actually outperformed by another person. Furthermore, the dependent variable involved generic ratings of others rather than ratings of specific outperformers. Thus, the question of whether self-presentational concerns influence the tendency to aggrandize specific outperformers awaits further research with the genius paradigm.
The assumption that exaggerating an outperformer's ability helps inferior performers maintain their sense of competence was assessed somewhat indirectly in Studies 1 and 2. In Study 3, we examined this assumption more directly by asking subjects to assess their general intelligence after being outperformed. Half of these subjects rated the outperformer's ability and the other half did not. Results showed that subjects given the chance to aggrandize the outperformer subsequently evaluated their own general intelligence more favorably than did subjects not given this opportunity. This study, therefore, provides more direct evidence that exaggerating the outperformer's ability is a construal mechanism that helps restore an inferior performer's threatened sense of competence.
• However, Study 3 also raises a number of issues that must be addressed in future research. The first issue concerns the dimensions on which people recoup their perceived ability as a result of being outperformed. In our study, perceptual intelligence represented the dimension of outperformance, and general intelligence was the dimension used to assess whether ability maintenance occurred. We speculated that evidence of ability maintenance would not occur on more comprehensive dimensions, such as general competence or self-esteem. In other words, we did not think that people's sense of competence on all dimensions or overall sense of self-worth would be influenced by the opportunity to aggrandize the target. However, because we did not obtain ratings on these dimensions, it remains to be seen how far people's overall sense of competence or esteem will be affected by target aggrandizement.
Another limitation of Study 3 is that the absence of a baseline comparison makes it impossible to discern whether people who exaggerate the outperformer's ability actually enhance their perceptions of their general intelligence or simply maintain the status quo. This question could be answered with a withinsubject design in which subjects' perceptions of their general intelligence (or some other appropriate competence measure) are assessed both before and after they are outperformed. One possibility is that the group given an opportunity to aggrandize the outperformer would actually show an increase in their perceived general intelligence, whereas the nonaggrandizing group would remain the same. This counterintuitive possibility would show that exaggerating the outperformer's competence actually improves one's own sense of competence in comparison to its preoutperformance level. The possibility we have advocated is that the aggrandizing group's general intelligence ratings would remain constant whereas those of the nonaggrandizing group would decrease. This pattern would indicate that exaggerating an outperformer's ability serves to protect a threatened identity from further damage. Further research is needed to distinguish between these two interpretations of the genius effect.
Study 4 showed that in addition to exaggerating the ability of outperformers, people exaggerate the ability of those they outperform. These findings, along with the findings of the previous studies, can be parsimoniously explained if one assumes that perceived competence is generally best served by exaggerating the ability of both superior and inferior performers. Whereas the tendency to elevate an outperformer salvages a threatened identity image, aggrandizing an inferior performer advances an already favorable image. Thus, people not only believe the person who outperforms them is exceptional, they also believe the person they outperform is no slouch.
Although a preponderance of research on upward social comparisons emphasizes their threatening nature, recent work suggests that upward comparisons may be more prevalent and desirable than previously thought. A number of studies have shown, for example, that people experience improved mood after learning about others who are better-off than they (e.g., Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Taylor, Aspinwall, Guiliano, Dakof, & Reardon, 1993) . Other studies have shown favorable effects of upward comparisons on self-evaluations (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994 ) and on self-esteem (Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992) in some circumstances. Although these studies did not incorporate ratings of the better-off individuals or superior performers, the genius effect provides a mechanism to help account for the beneficial effects of upward comparisons. This mechanism, as previously described, involves protecting inferior performers' sense of competence while maintaining believability.
Recent research on upward counterfactual reasoning is also relevant to the present research. Counterfactual reasoning refers to thoughts about how unexpected or unusual outcomes could have turned out differently (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese & Olson, 1995) . Upward counterfactuals, refer specifically to thoughts of how unfavorable events could have turned out more favorably. Upward counterfactuals have an obvious analogue in upward comparison choices. People may reason, "I could perform as well as this person if only I had more practice or tried harder," and so on. Thus, people who have been outperformed may think that-with a reasonable amount of effort, things may have turned out more favorably.
An important task for future research is to establish the parameters within which the genius effect occurs. The self-evaluation maintenance model assumes that the tendency to bask in a superior performer's glory occurs when the outperformer is close and the comparison dimension is unimportant. We assume that aggrandizing outperformers is consistent with basking in their superiority. In our research, however, the outperformer was not particularly close to the comparer. This suggests that the genius effect is not limited to comparisons with close others. Our divergence from the self-evaluation maintenance model in this regard hinges on the difference between basking in the outperformer's glory and aggrandizing the outperformer. We concur that basking without aggrandizing is unlikely to occur because of the threat posed by inferior performance. As we have argued previously, however, exaggerating the outperformer's ability is a powerful construal mechanism that deflects the threat to one's perceived competence without significantly distorting the outperformer's relative advantage. This mechanism can be successfully deployed, therefore, in comparisons with both close and distant others.
We further believe the tendency to exaggerate outperformers' abilities may be even stronger for dimensions that are central (versus peripheral) to the comparer's self-concept, because it is precisely in such circumstances that comparers must protect their sense of competence. In this regard, it will be important in future research to assess more central performance dimensions than perceptual intelligence. It would be useful, for example, to establish the importance of various dimensions to subjects in a pretesting session and then manipulate whether they are outperformed on dimensions that are most or least central to their self-concepts. However, an important logistical problem must be surmounted in varying the importance of the comparison dimension. If the comparison dimension is extremely important, comparers are likely to exaggerate their standing on the dimension, thus creating the previously discussed problem that comparers' elevated ratings of the outperformer could be a consequence of their higher self-evaluations. Because research has demonstrated that people are more self-serving on ambiguous than on unambiguous trait dimensions, this problem can potentially be circumvented if one defines the performance dimensions as unambiguously as possible.
As with other construal mechanisms, the tendency to exaggerate an outperformer's ability is limited by this tactic's plausibility. A healthy young adult who is bested in a weightlifting contest by a 90-year-old will have a hard time convincing himself or anyone else of the septegenerian's prodigious strength. Inferior performers are also likely to forego the exaggeration tactic when extensive distributional information is available. The inferior performer is unlikely to aggrandize the outperformer, for example, when she knows that she and the outperformer both scored in the lower decile of the class distribution.
Because exaggerating the outperformer's ability entails acknowledging another's superiority, people may also refrain from using this construal mechanism when other self-serving mechanisms are readily available. As stated in the introduction, we believe the tendency to exaggerate another's ability is most likely to occur when other self-serving avenues are blocked by the unambiguous nature of the comparison. When social comparisons are relatively unambiguous, self-serving construal mechanisms must be especially subtle and convincing. We believe that exaggerating the partner's ability fulfills these requirements impeccably. The comparer appears not only truthful, by acknowledging the outperformer's ability, but also magnanimous, by extolling it.
A final word is in order about the criteria we used to establish the genius effect. The tendency to exaggerate an outperformer was defined in terms of differences between subjects' and observers' ratings of the outperformer. Few studies on upward comparison have included an external criterion against which to calibrate inferior performers' attributions. In our research, observers' attributions served as the criterion against which subjects' attributions were assessed. A different observer of the same gender was yoked to each subject who was outperformed. To minimize informational differences, these observers were given extensive exposure to the perceptual intelligence task, although they did not take the test themselves. Thus, it seems unlikely the results were tainted by differences in subjects' and observers' informational vantage. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the genius effect is defined in terms of relative differences between subjects and observers rather than with reference to an absolute standard of accuracy, and that the validity of the inferences drawn about subjects' attributions is related to the validity of the criterion against which their attributions are compared.
